





























































4. Conclusion	In	summary,	whether	one	is	discussing	social	groups,	social	constructions,	or	any	other	social	entity,	realists	appeal	first	and	foremost	to	the	Explanatory	Argument.	According	to	this	argument,	if	our	best	explanations	posit	social	entities,	then	we	ought	to	believe	that	these	entities	exist.	However,	explanatory	pessimists	cite	science’s	history	of	failed	explanations	as	evidence	against	this	contention.	Fictionalists	also	challenge	this	realist	doctrine	by	claiming	that	we	can	use	social	entities	in	our	best	explanations	without	believing	in	their	existence.		 The	Explanatory	Argument	also	asserts	that	our	best	explanations	posit	social	entities.	Paying	special	attention	to	social	groups	reveals	two	challenges	to	this	claim.	First,	eliminativists	claim	that	statements	about	social	groups	are	false,	and	should	be	replaced	by	statements	about	individuals.	Second,	reductionists	claim	that	statements	about	social	groups	are	trivially	true,	because	they	are	really	just	shorthand	for	statements	about	individuals.	In	neither	case	do	our	best	explanations	posit	social	entities.		 Yet	another	aspect	of	realism	concerns	the	objectivity	of	social	entities.	As	we	saw,	realists	hold	that	social	entities	are	epistemically	objective,	in	the	sense	that	a	group’s	or	person’s	ideas	about	a	social	entity	could	be	wrong.	Constructivists,	by	contrast,	claim	that	(at	least	some)	social	entities	are	epistemically	subjective,	meaning	that	ideas	about	those	entities	determine	what	they	are.		 A	number	of	options	and	questions	suggest	themselves.	Can	realism	in	the	social	sciences	be	justified	without	the	Explanatory	Argument?	Can	the	challenges	of	eliminativism	and	reductionism	extend	to	social	entities	other	than	groups?	If	social	entities	are	not	real,	why	bother	studying	them?	What	would	social	scientists	lose	by	adopting	one	(or	more)	of	the	antirealist	stances	canvassed	above?	Given	the	variety	of	positions	available,	there	is	ample	room	for	having	nuanced	ontological	positions	in	the	social	sciences.		
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